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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
CLARENCE J. FRANKLIN, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 960161-CA 
Priority No. 2 
INTRODUCTION 
Defendant/Appellant Clarence J. Franklin ("Appellant" or 
"Franklin") refers this Court to the Jurisdictional Statement, 
Statement of the Issue, Text of Determinative Statutes, Statement 
of the Case, Statement of the Facts, and Argument in his opening 
brief. Appellant replies as follows. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT. THE CRIME "BRANDISHING" A WEAPON CONTAINS 
THE SAME ELEMENTS AS AGGRAVATED ASSAULT UNDER 
THESE CIRCUMSTANCES. 
The State is correct that in State v. Verdin, 595 P.2d 
862 (Utah 1979), the Utah Supreme Court considered whether the 
crimes of aggravated assault and drawing or exhibiting a weapon 
in a threatening manner contain identical elements. With very 
little discussion, the Court concluded that in the context of 
that case aggravated assault and exhibiting a weapon involved 
different crimes. The Court stated: 
Credible evidence in this case establishes all 
the elements of the higher crime, i.e., that 
Verdin aimed a deadly weapon, a loaded rifle, at 
a police officer, worked the action to put a 
shell into a firing chamber, and attempted to 
pull the trigger while declaring his intention to 
"smoke" the officer. This is quite a different 
and more reprehensible course of action than 
exhibiting a dangerous weapon in a threatening 
manner. 
Id. at 863. While Verdin does support the State's position, it 
is distinguishable in that the evidence in this case does not 
establish that Franklin aimed a loaded weapon, Franklin's alleged 
threat was a more general statement in the midst of profanities 
which apparently was not construed as a threat since David and/or 
Josh moved closer to Franklin after the statement, Franklin did 
not embellish on the threat by working the action, and Franklin 
did not pull the trigger while making a direct threat. Instead, 
according to the State's witnesses, Franklin's hand was hanging 
out the car window with a gun in it; he pointed the gun, which 
David initially thought was a toy, at David. R. 234-37. Then 
"he jumped back . . . closed the door and said, 'Let's go.'" 
R. 237-38. 
In State v. Oldrovd, 685 P.2d 551 (Utah 1984), the Utah 
Supreme Court considered whether the trial court erred in 
refusing to give the defendant's requested lesser included 
offense instruction for exhibition of a deadly weapon in a 
threatening manner. The Court pointed out that the test for 
determining whether a lesser included offense instruction which 
is requested by a defendant must be given is whether there is 
"some overlapping of the statutory elements of the offenses." 
Id. at 553. The crimes of aggravated assault and exhibiting a 
deadly weapon have elements in common since "[b]oth require a 
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form of threat and both require the use of a weapon." Id. at 
554. The Oldroyd Court clarified its holding in Verdin, stating: 
The [Verdin] Court affirmed the conviction and 
sentence for aggravated assault, saying that the 
evidence in the case established all the elements 
of the higher crime and that under the facts of 
that case the distinction in the level of 
proscribed conduct was clear. 
Id. (emphasis added). The Oldroyd Court further noted that 
in Verdin [the evidence] clearly established all 
of the elements of aggravated assault: Verdin 
used a deadly weapon (a loaded rifle) in making a 
threat to do bodily injury to another (declaring 
his intention to "smoke" the police officer), 
accompanied by a show of immediate force or 
violence (working the rifle action to put a shell 
in the firing chamber and attempting to pull the 
trigger while aiming the rifle at the police 
officer). 
Id. at 555. 
In the present case, the distinction between the two 
crimes is not as clear as it was in Verdin; indeed, under these 
facts, identical elements support both crimes. Both crimes 
involve "a form of threat and both require the use of a weapon." 
Oldroyd, 685 P.2d at 554. Neither Verdin nor Oldroyd expressly 
make the distinction drawn by the State that aggravated assault 
requires a threat of bodily injury whereas the crime of 
brandishing a weapon occurs when the weapon is merely displayed, 
and "[t]he defendant may be guilty of threatening even though 
there is no threat made or intended." State's brief at 12. In 
fact, Oldrovd appears to contradict this claim by the State since 
it expressly states that both crimes involve a "form of threat." 
Oldrovd, 685 P.2d at 554. 
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Additionally, the State does not clarify whether its 
claimed distinction requires an express threat to do bodily 
injury or whether implied threats based on the use of a dangerous 
weapon are sufficient to elevate the crime from the crime of 
brandishing to the crime of aggravated assault. Neither statute 
explicitly requires an express threat, and an express threat to 
do harm presumably would be a "form of threat" which would fit 
the requirements of either statute. Additionally, any time a gun 
is drawn or exhibited in an angry or threatening manner, a threat 
to do bodily injury is implied. Hence, drawing a gun in an angry 
or threatening manner would be a "form of threat" under either 
statute. In this case, where witnesses testified that Franklin 
pointed a gun while voicing a threat, the statutes required 
identical elements. 
The immediate show of force which was present in Verdin 
where the defendant "work[ed] the rifle action to put a shell in 
the firing chamber and attempt[ed] to pull the trigger while 
aiming the rifle at the police officer" (Oldrovd, 685 P.2d at 
551) is not present in this case. Accordingly, the conviction 
for aggravated assault should be reversed and judgment entered 
for threatening with or using a dangerous weapon in fight or 
quarrel, a class A misdemeanor. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant/Appellant Clarence J. Franklin respectfully 
requests that this Court reverse his conviction and remand this 
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case for resentencing on the charge of threatening with or using 
a dangerous weapon in fight or quarrel, a class A misdemeanor. 
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